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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
AMBIGUOUS PAYEES OF NEGOTIABLE PAPER
CHARLES R. McDOWELL*
It is elementary knowledge among American lawyers and business
men that title to a negotiable instrument payable to the order of a
specfied person does not pass under a purported negotiation thereof
unless the instrument bears the authentic indorsement of the person to
whose order it is drawn. The very object of making the instrument pay-
able to the order of a particular person is to require the indorsement of
the particular payee named therein. Perhaps it is not so commonly
known that most of the important commercial countries of the world
live under a different rule.1
One of the simplest illustrations of the well known American rule is
as follows: William Smith, who owes John Jones $1oo, desires to pay the
debt by check. Smith draws a check for $ioo on First Bank payable to
the order of John Jones, with the intention of personally delivering it
to Jones, but before delivery the check is stolen from the drawer Smith
by a fraudulent employee named Frank Fleece. Fleece forges the name
of the payee, Jones, as indorser, and cashes it at the Corner Drug Store,
the Drug Store giving Fleece the $ioo in cash. The Drug Store, after
placing its own blank indorsement thereon, cashes the check at the
Second Bank, to whom it is paid through the local clearing house by
the drawee First Bank, the First Bank charging Smith's account for
$1oo. The legal results of this transaction under the American rule are
as follows:
(i) Smith may require the drawee First Bank to recredit his ac-
count 2 for $1oo because, under our theory, payment by a drawee bank
to a party holding under a forged indorsement constitutes a mispay-
ment. The drawer has not authorized the bank to pay anyone except
parties holding under the true indorsement of the person to whose
order the check was drawn.
*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
'Hudson and Feller, The International Unification of Laws Concerning Bills of
Exchange (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 333, 354-
2Cases collected in Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed., Beutel, 1938)
327, citing Labor Bank & Trust Co. v. Adams, 23 S. W. (2d) 814 (Tex. Civ. App.




(2) The drawee First Bank, having recredited the drawer's ac-
count, may recover the $1oo from the recipient of payment 3 either upon
the theory that the payment was made under a mistake of fact or upon
the theory that the Second Bank, by virtue of presentment, warranted
that it had title to the check.
(3) The Second Bank may pass the loss back to the Drug Store by
suing upon the Drug Store's indorsement. The Drug Store must bear
the ultimate loss unless it can recover from the fraudulent party,
Fleece.
(4) The debt of Smith to Jones remains unpaid and Smith is
safe in delivering Jones another check for the $ioo. If Smith had
stopped the check and the Second Bank had sued Smith on the check,
the plaintiff would have been denied a recovery.
If all the facts in the case had been the same except that the check
was drawn payable to John Jones or bearer, we would have had en-
tirely different legal results:
(i) The drawer, Smith, could not have required the drawee First
Bank to recredit his account. Payment of a bearer check to any person
in possession thereof would constitute an authorized payment and pay-
ment to the Second Bank was therefore an authorized payment. The
fact that Jones' name was forged as indorser would make no difference
because no indorsement was necessary.
(2) The debt of Smith to Jones would remain alive and unpaid
and Smith would be obliged to pay the debt a second time. The loss
would fall upon Smith unless Smith could recover from the fraudu-
lent party, Fleece.
For the reasons shown above, it is customary for American busi-
ness men to draw checks payable to the order of named persons when-
ever they are to be sent through the mail or by messenger to the parties
sought to be paid, or whenever they are to be kept about the office for
any considerable time, or whenever the circumstances are such that
they may get into the hands of persons who may fraudulently cash
them. Checks are seldom drawn payable to bearer or to cash, which
amounts to the same thing,4 unless they are counter checks intended
for immediate delivery. To the American business man, drawing a
check payable to the order of John Jones is the same thing as stamping
on it in red letters: "Look out, purchaser; you are not safe in buying
Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, i Hill 287 (N. Y. 1841).
'Negotiable Instruments Law § 9 (4).
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this instrument unless it bears the authentic indorsement of John
Jones; and look out, drawee bank; you are not authorized to pay this
check to any person except Jones unless you are sure that it bears JQnes'
authentic indorsement."
Since the principle concern of this discussion is to consider how far
the protection afforded the drawer in making the instrument payable
to the order of a named person should be carried, it may be well to,
compare our rule with those of the other important commercial coun-
tries, and to consider very briefly the history of the problem.
The first reported English case deciding the effect of a forgery of
the payee's signature was decided by Lord Mansfield in 1799.5 The
purchaser of goods had accepted and paid the bill drawn by the seller
for the price to a transferee of the bill holding under a forged indorse-
ment. When the assignee in bankruptcy of the seller sued the pur-
chaser for the price of the goods, the purchaser pleaded payment, re-
lying upon payment of the bill to the holder under the forged in-
dorsement. The court held that the purchaser was required to pay
again. Lord Mansfield said: "The instrument could not be paid with-
out the payee's hand and the defendant has been negligent in inquir-
ing whether it was their hand or not." A few years later the English
court went so far as to hold that a title to a bill of exchange payable to
the order of a particular person did not pass to a purchaser who had
taken the instrument from a forger who happened to bear the same
name.6 The American cases have followed in the line marked out by
the early English cases, and it remains as true as ever in the United
States that no title to face order paper may pass under a forgery of the
payee's signature7
Mr. Friedrich Kessler, in a comprehensive article entitle "Forged
Indorsement," appearing in the April, 1938 issue of the Yale Law
Journal,8 says:
"Under the Uniform Codes on Bills of Exchange and Checks,
which were drafted in Geneva in 1931 and 1932 and have been
adopted in most of the Civil Law countries, a holder acquiring
an instrument in good faith and without gross negligence by an
5Aaron Smith & Another, Assignees of Bengali & Hard v. Shepperd, Hil. 16 Geo.
IIl, cited in Chitty, Bills of Exchange (ist ed. 1799) 126 note 4.
'Mead v. Young, 4 T. R. 28, 1oo Eng. Rep. 876 (K. B. 1790).
-Where drawer had two customers named H. E. Richards and carelessly mailed
the check to the wrong H. E. Richards, title was held to pass under forgery made by
wrong H. E. Richards, but this was in effect on estoppel. See, Slattery & Co. v. Nat.
City Bank, 114 Misc. 48, 186 N. Y. Supp. 679 (1920).
'Kessler, Forged instruments (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 866.
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uninterrupted series of indorsements has good title even in a
case where the instrument was lost or stolen and one of the sig-
natures forged." 9
Returning to our two illustrative cases contrasting the result of
Smith's drawing the check to the order of Jones and to Jones or bearer,
we see that under the Geneva Uniform Codes, it would make no differ-
ence whether the check was drawn to order or to bearer so long as the
Drug Store and the Second Bank and the drawee First Bank acted hon-
estly and without gross negligence and the indorsements on the back
of the instrument appeared to be regular and uninterrupted. It is
noteworthy, furthermore, that the English Bills of Exchange Act gives
us the same result as the Geneva Uniform Codes so far as demand paper
drawn on banks is concerned.10 Checks are, of course, within this cate-
gory.
It is obvious that the other great commercial countries of the world
give no such protection to the drawer of face order paper as is afforded
under our system of law and under the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Act. Under our system we have two types of negotiable paper
that are as different as black and white. American face bearer paper is
freely transferable by any person in possession thereof, even though the
holder holds under a finder or thief, and the drawee of a face bearer
check is authorized to pay it to any person in possession of it;" but no
title passes under a purported sale of face order paper in America un-
less the authentic indorsement of the payee appears on it,12 and no
bank is authorized to pay a face order check unless such authentic in-
dorsement of the payee is shown. In the other great commercial coun-
tries of the world, face bearer paper is the same as our own, but face
order paper is so different from ours that, from our American point of
view, it is really semi-bearer paper or quasi-bearer paper. Under' the
Geneva Uniform Codes, title to face order paper passes as freely
through finders and thieves and forgers as face bearer paper, so long as
the chain of indorsement appears to be regular and uninterrupted and
the purchaser is honest and free from gross negligence. 13
It is not likely that many American lawyers or business men would
prefer to adopt the rule of the Geneva Uniform Codes. So long as the
indorsement of the payee is required, debtors will feel safe in sending
'Geneva Bills of Exchange Act, Art. 16 (2); Geneva Check Act, Art. 21.
IOSee Bills of Exchange Act § 6o.
"See Negotiable Instruments Law § 40.
"See Negotiable Instruments Law § § 23 and 9 (5).
"See Note supra.
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checks to their creditors by mail or by messenger. When the protection
is withdrawn, they will not feel safe in doing so, as has been demon-
strated by the lesser use of checks in the countries adopting the Geneva
Codes.
We come, then, to the question of how the court should hold when
an ambiguity arises as to who the payee really is. Suppose William
Smith owes a debt to a man named H. Davis and draws a check on
First Bank payable to the order of H. Davis, and this check is stolen by
another man who happens to bear the name H. Davis. The thief writes
"H. Davis" on the back of the instrument and cashes it at Second Bank.
The Second Bank has required the party to be identified and has been
informed by reliable parties that the man's name is really H. Davis.
Second Bank collects the amount of the check from First Bank. What
result? It was decided as early as 18go in England that no title passes
under the indorsement of a man who happens to bear the name of the
true payee. The drawer could therefore require the drawee First Bank
to recredit his account. The drawee payer, First Bank, could require the
recipient, Second Bank, to return the money. The Second Bank would
bear the ultimate loss unless it could recover from the thief.
As a practical matter, it is usually true that there will have been
a previous transaction giving rise to a debt which will identify the
particular H. Davis by whom the instrument should have been in-
dorsed. In the ordinary case of Smith drawing a check to the order of
H. Davis, it is probably true that there is not more than one H. Davis
in the world with whom the drawer Smith has recently had a business
transaction creating a debt for the amount for which the check is
drawn. Furthermore, the correspondence between the creditor, H.
Davis, and the drawer of the check is usually available and makes clear
which H. Davis, among all the people in the world named H. Davis,
was to indorse the instrument. It would have been reasonable for the
courts to have required the drawer to insert the business address or the
position occupied by the particular H. Davis after the name of the
payee in order to avoid the consequences of the drawee paying the
check to the indorsee of the wrong H. Davis, but no such precise iden-
tification has been required. Having failed to require such a precise
identification, should the question of who the true payee is be deemed
a question of intention of the drawer, or is it a question of fact? If it is
a question of intention, then it should be remembered that it is the
secret subjective intention of the drawer that is to control the case.
The objective appearance of the bill carries no further warning than
that some H. Davis is to indorse.
[Vol. II
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In a well known English case,14 where the court was attempting to
decide whether an instrument which objectively read "payable to the
order of Petridi & Co." was payable to a particular company called
Petridi & Co., or on the other hand was payable to a fictitious payee
within the meaning of Section 7 (3) of the Bills of Exchange Act, Lord
Herschell said: "It is not a question of intention. It is a question of
fact. The instrument was not payable to Petridi & Co. of Constanti-
nople, as the forger intended the accepter to believe. The bills repre-
sented no transaction with Petridi & Co ......
Whatever Lord Herschell may have thought about how the so-called
true payee ought to be determined, the courts ordinarily talk in the
opinions as if it were purely a question of intention. They tell us that
the payee is the person the drawer intends to be the payee and that
the payee is fictitious when the drawer so intends.
One of the situations most frequently giving rise to the ambiguous
payee problem is the so-called imposter case. In this type of case, it
becomes important to decide whether the matter is to be settled by
groping for the intention of the drawer, or whether, on the other hand,
the question is to be settled as a question of fact by looking to such
surrounding circumstances as the transaction giving rise to the debt.
The following facts exemplify the typical impersonation case: Wil-
liam Smith owes a debt of $ioo to John Jones, whom he has never seen.
Smith, by correspondence with John Jones, informs Jones that he will
give him a check for the $1oo whenever Jones wishes it. Jones replies
that he will call for the check on Tuesday. Frank Fleece, a fraudulent
party, who has learned all about the matter, calls at Smith's office be-
fore Jones arrives and introduces himself as John Jones. After an ex-
change of courtesies, Smith draws a check for $ioo on First Bank,
payable to the order of John Jones, and delivers it to the man before
him, whom he believes to be Jones, but who is in fact Fleece. The im-
poster, Fleece, writes the name of John Jones on the back of the instru-
ment and cashes it at Second Bank, to whom it is paid through the
clearing house by First Bank, the drawee, First Bank charging Smith's
account for the $ioo.
If this transaction is to be treated as a case of ordinary forgery of
the order payee's signature, the results are simple. The payment of the
check will be regarded as a mispayment by the drawee bank because the
drawee bank will be deemed to have paid a check to an unauthorized
2 Vagliano v. Bank of England, 23 Q. B. D. 243, 58 L. J. Q. 357 (1889) .
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party, and the depositor Smith may compel First Bank to recredit his
account for $1oo. First Bank will be permitted to recover the $ioo from
Second Bank, which will bear the ultimate loss unless it can recover
from the forger. But the majority of cases does not treat the impersona-
tion case described above as a case of ordinary forgery of the payee's
signature. Most courts hold that title to the check passed under the
indorsement of the named payee forged by the imposter. Whether the
suit be brought by the depositor Smith against his depository bank for
balance of deposit account, or is brought by the purchaser of the check
against the drawer, the courts hold that title to the check passed de-
spite the fact that Fleece committed a criminal forgery. The check, they
tell us, was indorsed by the very man intended to indorse. That man
was not Jones, whose name was written in the payee space. It was the
imposter Fleece that the drawer intended to indorse. This result is
achieved by an amazingly fantastic rationalization. 15
When William Smith drew the check payable to the order of his
creditor, John Jones, and handed it to the imposter who stood before
him, Smith had two conflicting intents: First, an intent to require the
indorsement of his real creditor, Jones; second, the intent that the man
before him indorse. The next step in the supposed reasoning is for the
court to convince itself that the intent that the real creditor, Jones, be
required to indorse was a mere vague ultimate objective, but the intent
to have the very man before him indorse was an immediate, direct
intent. This direct, vigorous intent to have the imposter indorse, of
course, prevails over the puny, remote, ultimate-objective type of in-
tent that the creditor, Jones, indorse. In order to convince themselves
that the right party has indorsed the instrument, one additional mental
hurdle must be taken with a sort of metaphysical Russian leap. The
hurdle is simply this: The imposter really was not named John Jones.
His name was Frank Fleece, and if the purchaser, Second Bank, had
had him identified, it would have learned that the man's name was
Fleece and not Jones. But this barrier is flitted over by explaining to
us that a man may adopt a name which is not really his own for a par-
ticular transaction of this sort. For example, suppose a man who was
15Montgomery Garage Co. v. Mfr's. Liability Ins. Co., 94 N. J. L. 152, 1o9 At. 196
(1920). Approved in Note (1920) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 76, where whole problem of im-
personation is reviewed. Cases are collected in Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law
(6th ed., Beutel, 1938) 349-58. In Tolman v. American Exch. Bank, 22 R. I. 462, 48
Atl. 480, 52 L. R. A. 877 (19o1) the court treated signature of imposter as an ordi-
nary forgery and therefore nugatory under Section 23 of N. I. L. Mr. Beutel says
cases are overwhelmingly to contrary at common law and cases cited show law of
cases decided since N. I. L. are contra.
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named Frank Fleece by his parents and whose birth certificate carried
his name as Frank Fleece and who was christened Frank Fleece and
whose name in the family Bible was Frank Fleece, went into the busi-
ness of selling novelties from door to door, and by reason of being
ashamed of his occupation, he introduced himself to prospective cus-
tomers as John Jones. Now, if he sold an article to William Smith and
Smith made the check payable to the order of John Jones at his re-
quest, the indorsement by Fleece of the name Jones would pass title.
Fleece would have adopted the name Jones for the transaction and
would not have committed a crime in so doing. And so, the court by
first deciding that the direct intent to deal with the man before him
should prevail over the remote, ultimate-objective type of intent, and
then telling us that the imposter Fleece has adopted the name Jones for
the purpose of the transaction, the result flows as inevitably as water
down hill that the right payee has indorsed when Fleece has written
Jones' name on the back of the check.16
The writer believes that the rule of the Anglo-American law, abso-
lutely requiring the indorsement of the order payee, works better than
the Continental system, which renders face order paper merely quasi-
bearer paper, and that this rule should never be relaxed or qualified
where it is clear who the true payee is, and that the compromise of the
English Statute found in Section 6o was undesirable from a commercial
standpoint. He also feels that the line of decisions called the imperson-
ation cases introduces an improper exception to our general rule; that
these cases are based upon a false analogy to the same situation in the
law of sales. The sales cases involving ordinary personal property bear
no warning as to the requisite of any indorsement, whereas the very
word "order" on negotiable paper should be a warning to the pur-
chaser that he cannot rely on possession alone, but must be sure the
order payee's authentic indorsement is on the instrument. The reason-
ing of the courts in these cases is so whimsical and fantastic as to fit
more naturally into Alice In Wonderland than in the covers of a law
book. The minds of the judges in deciding the imposter cases fly away
on wings of fancy to an invisible world, where they referee a death.
struggle between two invisible knights for the control of the domain-
of true subjective intent. They see the young, vigorous Knight of the-
Immediate Intent prevail over the sickly old Knight of the Remote
Ultimate Intent. They then descend to the world of objective reality
2OSee opinion in Montgomery Garage Co. v. Mfgr's Liability Ins. Co., 94 N. J. L.
152, 1o9 At. 296 (1920).
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with a decision which is contrary to business exigency and which
further muddies a stream that was none too clear.
An even more troublesome problem concerning the necessity of the
indorsement of the named payee arises when the payee named is "ficti-
tious" within the meaning of Section 9, Subsection 3 of the Negotiable
Investments Law. According to Section 9 of the N. I. L., the instrument
is payable to bearer when (i) it is expressed to be so.payable, (2) pay-
able to a named person or bearer, (3) payable to the order of a ficti-
tious or non-existent person and such fact is known to the person mak-
ing it so payable, (4) when the name of the payee does not purport to
be the name of any person, (5) when the only or last indorsement is an
indorsement in blank.
A clear understanding of Section 9-3 of the N. I. L. requires some
preliminary consideration of the problems of other sub-sections of Sec-
tion 9.
It is obvious that there are at least two different types of paper which
may be "payable to bearer"- (i) true face bearer paper, which is al-
ways "payable to bearer"' 7 and (2) order paper, which may or may not
be "payable to bearer" at a given moment, depending upon the in-
dorsements.' 8
According to the usual taught law, Sub-sections i and 2 refer to
face-bearer paper, which under Section 40 is permanently bearer paper
throughout its whole commercial life. This type of paper cannot be
controlled by the type of indorsement placed on it.
If William Smith makes a note payable on its face to John Jones
or bearer, and Jones indorses it specially to Ames and Ames indorses it
specially to Bates and Bates indorses it specially to Caldwell, and it is
stolen from Caldwell by Fleece and sold by Fleece to a bona fide pur-
chaser before maturity, the b. f. p. gets good title.
A purchaser of face bearer paper is safe in purchasing it from any
person in possession thereof, even though the party in possession turns
out to have been a finder or thief and the fact that the instrument bears
special indorsements makes no difference. 19 The purchaser is not
obliged to turn over a face bearer note and examine the indorsements,
because it was the policy of the draftsman to create a type of commer-
"Negotiable Instruments Law § 40: "Where an instrument, payable to bearer, is
endorsed specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery ......
18Negotiable Instruments Law § 9 (5).
"It is not a futile gesture to specially indorse face bearer paper because by so do-
ing the indorser limits his own liability as an indorser to parties holding under his
special indorsee. See Negotiable Instruments Law § 40, last clause.
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cial paper which could be paid to any person in possession of it, re-
gardless of the indorsements. The only limitations upon this policy are
that the purchaser must act with bona fides; that he shall not have
had knowledge of the fact that his transferor was a finder or thief and
that he have the other statutory qualifications of an h. d. c.
The statement in 9-5, that the instrument is "payable to bearer"
when the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank, ob-
viously refers to paper that is not face bearer paper or true bearer
paper at all. This sub-section clearly refers to order paper; that is,
paper that is payable on its face to the order of a named person. Such
paper requires the indorsement of the person to whose order it is
drawn or the person to whom it may have been specially indorsed. It is
intended to be controlled by the indorsements that are placed on it
and intended that its nature, as to freedom of transfer, fluctuate with
the indorsements placed on it.20
A note payable on its face to the order of Jones after having been
indorsed in blank by Jones may be negotiated several times by simple
delivery, but any holder, even though he take the instrument by de-
livery only, may indorse it specially and thereby require the indorse-
ment of his transferee. For example, Smith makes a note payable to the
order of Jones, and Jones indorses it in blank and sells it to Ames and
delivers it to Ames. Title passes to Ames because the only indorsement
is in blank. Now Ames sells it to Bates and delivers it without indorse-
ment. Bates gets good title because it is still true that the only indorse-
ment is in blank. Now Fleece steals it from Bates and sells it to Carr, an
innocent purchaser. Can- gets good title because the only indorsement is
in blank. Now Can- indorses it specially to Dill, from whom it is stolen
by Crooks, who sells it to Ellis, a bona fide purchaser. Ellis does not get
title because the last indorsement was not in blank; the last indorse-
ment was a special indorsement to Dill and Dill's indorsement was
required.
When the expression "payable to bearer" is employed, it signifies
that the purchaser is safe in buying it from any person in possession of
it, and that the obligor or drawee is safe in paying it to any person in
possession. True bearer paper-that is, face bearer paper-is always
OSmith v. Clarke, Peake 295, 170 Eng. Rep. 162 (N. P. 1794). Contra: Parker v.
Roberts, 243 Mass. 174, 137 N. E. 295 (1922). Historical discussion of problem found
in Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed., Beutel, 1938) 499. Negotiable In-
struments Law § 9 (5) is almost an exact copy of Bills of Exchange Act § 8 (4), and
the author of the Bills of Exchange Act says it was his purpose in writing § 8 (4) to
repeal the rule of Smith v. Clarke. See Chalmers, Law of Bills of Exchange (3rd ed.)
21.
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"payable to bearer," whereas face order paper may or may not be
"payable to bearer" depending upon whether the last indorsement is in
blank. If the last indorsement on order paper is blank, it is "payable to
bearer" for the time being, but that has not changed the essential nature
of the instrument. It has not become "true" bearer paper because it is
for the time being "payable to bearer." As soon as a special indorse-
ment goes on it, that special indorsee's indorsement is required.
Now, what does Sub-section 3 of Section 9 mean when it says an in-
strument is "payable to bearer" when it is payable to the order of a fic-
titious or non-existent party, and such fact was known to the party
making it so payable?
A flood of questions arises in the mind of the reader who encounters
this remarkable statement of law for the first time. (i) Does it mean
that the instrument is true bearer paper, permanently payable to
bearer, such as the bearer paper described in 9-1 and 9-2, or does it
mean that it is simply temporarily "payable to bearer" under certain
circumstances? (2) How does it come about that the nature of a nego-
tiable instrument, which ordinarily must bear its character on its
face, derives its character from the subjective intention or knowledge
of the drawer rather than from the objective appearance of the note?
(3) Why should a drawer make the instrument payable to the order of
a fictitious party? What is the drawer trying to do when he makes it
payable to a fictitious person rather than making it payable to his
creditor? (4) Would a note payable to the order of Kitty Foyle be pay-
able to bearer if the drawer knew she was a fictitious character? (5)
What about a note payable to Theodore Roosevelt? (6) Was there a
time in our legal history when it was conventional commercial prac-
tice to draw instruments payable to the order of such characters as
Mother Goose or Jack Sprat, with the deliberate purpose of creating
bearer paper? (7) Would a 19 th century business man recognize a note
payable to Silas Marner as bearer paper, and know how to deal with
it? (8) Would a remote purchaser know whether a note payable to the
order of Tweedle Dee could be controlled by a special indorsement?
The facts are, so far as the cases disclose, that there never was any
commercial custom, in England or the United States, of deliberately
creating face bearer paper by drawing it to the order of famous fiction-
al characters, and there has never been a time in our history when
bankers regarded instruments payable to the order of such fictitious
characters as Humpty Dumpty as conventional face bearer paper, safely
purchasable from any person in possession without regard to the in-
dorsements found on the back.
Vol. II
AMBIGUOUS PAYEES
Furthermore, except for the unfortunate wording of Section 9-3,
nobody would ever have supposed this to be true. The doctrine of the
fictitious payee grew out of a greatly misunderstood group of cases,
which will be discussed in detail, in which the court was presented with
nothing more than a simple question of whether or not a particular
person, the drawer, could in effect be estopped from insisting upon
proof of the authentic indorsement of a person, proof of whose indorse-
ment was impossible of production because there was in fact no such
person as the person whose name the drawer had written in the payee
space.
If the case history of the fictitious payee doctrine discloses no evi-
dence of any commercial custom of intentionally creating bearer paper
by drawing instruments to the order of famous characters in fiction,
then what has been the motive of the drawers who have done this
unusual thing? What is the drawer trying to do? A simple example will
illustrate.
William Smith, who owes John Jones money which he is unable to
pay, and who is attempting to induce Jones to take a note for the
amount in lieu of cash, decides that the note will be more readily
salable if Jones appears to be a party who has purchased the note from
a former holder after due investigation, than if Jones appeared in his
true light as the immediate creditor of a financially embarrassed debtor;
also, that the instrument's salability will be enhanced if the note bears
two indorsements rather than one. In order to create this false appear-
ance of Jones being a transferee rather than a mere promisee, and in
order to deceive the prospective purchaser into believing that the note
carries the liability of two indorsers rather than one, Smith makes the
note payable to the order of J. E. James, a wholly imaginary party as
far as the actual transaction is concerned, and makes the initial de-
livery to his own creditor, Jones, with the understanding that Jones is
to first write the name "J. E. James" on the back of the note and then
indorse his own name. When the party in Smith's position has been
sued on the note by the transferee of Jones, he has sometimes had the
temerity to deny the purchaser's title, upon the theory that the J. E.
James indorsement was a forgery.
Certainly justice requires that the bona fide purchaser from Jones
ought to get judgment against the drawer. Surely the fraudulent drawer
should not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong by deny-
ing that the transferee obtained title under Jones' indorsement.
It is possible to justify the desired result in several ways: (1) We
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may say that Jones was authorized to indorse the payee's name. (2) We
may say that Jones was the true payee and that Jones has indorsed.
(3) We may say that the instrument was "payable to bearer" at the
moment the plaintiff purchased it from Jones. (4) We may say that the
drawer, Smith, who has colluded with his creditor, Jones, to create the
appearance of ownership in Jones by authorizing Jones to write the
name of James on the instrument, is estopped to deny that Jones owned
the instrument at the time Jones indorsed it to the plaintiff.
If we are to consider nothing except the case of the purchaser against
the drawer, it does not matter which theory we adopt; but, if in order
to get this result in this one case, we decide that the instrument itself,
which appears to be an order instrument, has become a true bearer in-
strument, the implications are unfortunate.
Suppose, for example, that this instrument, which appeared to be
an order instrument payable to J. E. James, had been transferred sev-
eral times and had finally come into the hands of Martin, who reason-
ably thought he had bought an order instrument; that Martin at
Nelson's request indorsed it specially to Nelson, from whom it was
stolen by a thief, who sold it to Parker. Now shall we say that Nelson
has been deprived of his ownership by the sale to Parker by the thief
simply because J. E. James turns out to be fictitious, and Parker can
prove that the drawer knew that fact?
It is one thing to estop the drawer to deny that Jones had title to
the instrument and power to transfer it to the purchaser; it is quite
another thing to say that the instrument, which appears to be order
paper, has become permanently bearer paper.
It is this failure to distinguish an estoppel against a particular per-
son from a change in the essential nature of the instrument itself that
has caused the confusion in the minds of people attempting to under-
stand the fictitious payee doctrine.
Sub-section 3 of Section 9 of the N. I. L. is so worded as to indi-
cate that the drawer's intentionally making an instrument payable to
the order of a fictitious party goes beyond affecting the drawer per-
sonally and changes the essential nature of the instrument. If it was the
intention of the draftsman of the N. I. L. to declare that face order
paper really became face bearer paper by virtue of the drawer's knowl-
edge that the payee named was fictitious, then commercial paper which
is supposed ordinarily to carry its negotiability and legal character upon
its face2' is made in this instance to take its character from something
2Wettelaufer v. Baxter, 137 Ky. 362, 125 S. W. 741 (igio); Hull v. Angus, 6o Ore.
95, 118 Pac. 284 (1911).
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that does not objectively appear on the instrument, and the nature of
the instrument is to be derived from the secret intention of the drawer.
Mr. Victor H. Kulp, in an excellent article appearing in the Michi-
gan Law Review in 1920,22 says: "The doctrine of the fictitious payee
had its origin in a series of cases that arose out of bills drawn by Live-
say & Co., Bankrupts." 23 A careful examination of these cases discloses
that they do not present any necessity of holding that the instrument's
essential nature was changed by the drawer's knowledge that the named
payee was fictitious. In each of the cases a fraudulent drawer was, in
effect, personally estopped to deny that a particular party had received
title where the drawer had, for the purpose of creating a false impres-
sion, put a fictitious name in the payee space. In none of these cases was
it necessary for the court to decide that the paper became actually
bearer paper.
The first appealed case involving the fictitious payee problem was
Tatlock v. Harris,24 decided in the year of the adoption of the United
States Constitution, which by reason of being the first may justify dis-
cussion at some length.
The defendant, Harris, who owed money to Lewis & Potter, and
who was about to draw a bill of exchange upon himself in order to pay
it, instead of drawing the bill payable to the order of Lewis & Potter,
drew the bill payable to the order of a fictitious payee, Grigson & Co.,
the drawer, according to the court's view of the evidence, knowing at
the time he drew the instrument that there was no such company as
Grigson & Co.
The drawer then made the initial delivery of the bill to his own
immediate creditor, Lewis & Potter, and Lewis & Potter first wrote the
name of the payee, Grigson & Co., on the back of the paper and beneath
it indorsed their own name. Thereafter, the instrument was negotiated
to the plaintiff for value. At the time when the plaintiff bought the
instrument, it appeared to have been originally issued to some creditor
named Grigson & Co., and to have been first negotiated by Grigson &
Co. to the plaintiff's transferor, Lewis & Potter. The plaintiff perhaps
thought when he purchased the bill: "If the drawer doesn't pay it, I
can recover from Lewis & Potter, and if Lewis & Potter default, I can
fall back upon this house called Grigson & Co."
IKulp, The Fictitious Payee (1920) t8 Mich. L. Rev. 296.
2-3Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T. R. 174, loo Eng. Rep. 517 (1789); Vere v. Lewis, 3 T. R.
182, loo Eng. Rep. 522 (1789); Collis v. Emett, i H. Bl. 313, 126 Eng. Rep. 185
(1790); Minet v. Gibson, 3 T. R. 481, loo Eng. Rep. 689 (1789).
243 T. R. 174, loo Eng. Rep. 517 (1789).
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Now, when the plaintiff, Tatlock, sued on the bill, the defendant
had the bad grace to deny the plaintiff's title upon the theory that no
authentic indorsement by Grigson & Co. had been proven.
The court, of course, held for the plaintiff. Lord Kenyon's opinion
amounted substantially to this: The defendant drawer, who has issued
a bill of exchange for value in such form as that it purports to require
the indorsement of a party whose indorsement is impossible because the
party is non-existent, and who, in good conscience, ought to pay it,
cannot avoid payment by insisting upon production of proof of a sig-
nature which it is impossible to produce. The action was an action on
the case.
The first count went upon the theory that the bill was payable to
Grigson & Co. and that Grigson & Co. had indorsed; the second upon
the theory that the bill was originally payable to Lewis & Potter; the
third for money paid by plaintiff to the use of defendant; the fourth
for money had and received by defendant to the use of the, defendant.
Lord Kenyon said:
"On the first count our opinion does not proceed, neither is it
necessary to say anything upon the second, though if it were
necessary to resort to that, I confess I have an opinion on it.
But the counts on which the judgment of the court is given are
those for money paid and money had-and received... it was an
appropriation of so much money to be paid to the person who
should become the holder of the bill."
In the next case, Vere v. Lewis, 25 decided upon the same day as
Tatlock v. Harris, the drawers, Livesay & Co., in order to create the
false appearance that they were purchasers of a bill drawn upon the
defendant, a collusive party, drew the bill payable to the order of a
fictitious party, Lawrence Ashworth, instead of making it payable to
themselves. They first made a fictitious indorsement of the name in the
payee space and then placed their own indorsement below it and sold
the bill to the plaintiff.
In this suit by the plaintiff transferee against the defendant drawee
acceptor, the first count stated that the bill was drawn payable to
Lawrence Ashworth and that it was indorsed by Lawrence Ashworth.
The second count stated that the bill was drawn payable to bearer.
The court held for the plaintiff. Lord Kenyon, C. J., Buller, J., and
Ashhurst, J., thought the plaintiff should recover on the second count,
which alleged that the instrument was drawn payable to bearer. This is
2- 3 T. R. 182, oo Eng. Rep. 522 (1789).
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the first judicial opinion that an instrument payable to the order of a
fictitious party is "payable to bearer."
Minet v. Gibson,26 a case similar to the last cases discussed, was
taken to the House of Lords upon the following agreed special verdict:
"... that Livesay & Co. drew on the defendant a bill of exchange
to the order of John White, knowing that no such person as
White existed and that an indorsement of the name John White
was made by Livesay & Co. to Livesay & Co. and that the defend-
ant accepted, knowing that no such person as John White existed
and that the indorsement purporting to be the indorsement of
White was fictitious and that the defendant had not paid the
bill... but whether the defendants are liable the jurors are ig-
norant and pray the advice of the court."
The court decided that the case was controlled by Vere v. Lewis and
held for the plaintiff, adding that the reason it was agreed to be turned
into a special verdict was that it might be carried to the dernier resort.
It now becomes obvious that none of the original cases giving rise
to the fictitious payee doctrine presented the court with any necessity
of deciding that an instrument, appearing on its face to be an order
instrument, became essentially face bearer paper simply because the
drawer knew that the payee was fictitious.
All that was necessary to decide in these cases was this: A party who
deliberately represents the instrument to be payable on its face to the
order of a named person, e. g., John White, and who authorizes another
person to write the name of "John White" on the back of the instru-
ment, in order to mislead a prospective purchaser into believing that
there was an existing former holder named John White and that the
said John White has indorsed, will be personally estopped to deny that
there is such a person as John White and that the said John White has
indorsed the instrument.
The same result is reached by saying that such parties are person-
ally estopped to deny that the title passed without the indorsement of
the non-existent person just as if the instrument had been payable to
bearer.
Granting that the facts plus the results go no further than invoking
personal estoppels against particular parties in favor of particular per-
sons, it must be admitted that the court in two of the cases says the in-
struments were "payable to bearer." Upon the basis of what was said in
these opinions, rather than upon the basis of what was done with the
narrow factual situations, a vague doctrine has grown up to the effect
"3 T. R. 481, 1o Eng. Rep. 689 (1789).
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that the instruments knowingly drawn to the order of fictitious payees
were bearer paper.
The rule was finally written into the English Bills of Exchange Act
as Section 7-3 in the following words: "Where the payee is a fictitious
or non-existing person, the bill may be treated as payable to bearer."
This same vague doctrine was written in our Act in the following
words, found in Sub-section 3 of Section 9: "The instrument is payable
to bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existent
person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable."
It is significant that 7-3 of the B. E. A. simply says "may be treated
as payable to bearer." It suggests that the draftsman of the B. E. A.
might have meant that the court at its discretion in a proper case could
treat an order instrument as if it were payable to bearer as against cer-
tain parties and in favor of certain parties. In other words, 7-3 of the
B. E. A. is susceptible of being interpreted as a statutory permission for
the invocation of a personal estoppel against a drawer in favor of a
purchaser or an acceptor who has been misled.
To say that Section 9-3 of the N. I. L. is a simple legislative permis-
sion to treat true order paper as if it were payable to bearer as against
particular parties and in favor of particular parties is not so easy. Such
an interpretation carries us a long way from the literal language of 9-3
and even forces us to ignore the immediate context.
The Statute says the instrument is payable to bearer, and it says this
in the very section in which the form of face bearer paper is described
and in a sub-section following two sub-sections27 which clearly refer to
face bearer or true bearer, and immediately before a sub-section clearly
referring to face bearer paper.
28
The arguments against assuming 9-3 was intended to make true
bearer paper of instruments knowingly drawn to the order of a ficti-
tious payee outweigh the arguments for accepting the literal language.
(i) The idea of the negotiability or freedom of transfer of an in-
strument being derived from the subjective mental attitude of the
drawer rather than from the objective appearance of the instrument
itself violates the fundamental theory upon which the whole super-
structure of negotiable instruments law is built.
(2) The cases from which the doctrine of the fictitious payee is
historically descended were cases involving, in effect, personal estop-
pels rather than being cases involving the nature of the instrument.
2--Negotiable Instruments Law § 9 (1) and (2).
"Negotiable Instruments Law § 9 (4).
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(3) The argument that the rule presumptively relates to true
bearer paper because it is found in the section dealing with face bearer
paper breaks down by reason of the fact that Section 9 also deals with
face order paper. Sub-section 5 clearly refers to face order paper, which
under certain circumstances becomes "payable to bearer" temporarily.
That some English jurists sensed that there was nothing more than
a personal estoppel in the fictitious payee cases is shown by the follow-
ing quotation from the draftsman of the B. E. A., Lord Chalmers, writ-
ing in the Law Quarterly Review29 concerning Vagliano's case, involv-
ing the fictitious payee problem:
"Some of the judges seemed inclined to the view that the case
was outside the provisions of the B. E .A .... and that the in-
struments involved in this case were not bills... they could only
be described as bills by estoppel, that is, for certain purposes
and as against certain parties certain individuals were pre-
cluded by the fact of acceptance from denying that they were
bills, and it by no means followed that the bankers were bound
by any estoppel which might have arisen against the acceptor."
In order to understand this statement, an outline of the facts of
Vagliano's30 case becomes necessary. Vagliano, a London merchant, was
accustomed to accept bills in favor of C. Petridi &c Co., drawn by its
correspondent, Vucina, payable at the Bank of England. Vagliano ac-
cepted a bill purporting to have been drawn by Vucina to the order of
C. Petridi & Co., but which had in fact been forged by his own fraudu-
lent employee, Gyka, the payee being legally "fictitious." 1 Gyka wrote
the name of the "fictitious" payee on the back of the bill after it had
been accepted by Vagliano, and the Bank of England paid the bill to
Gyka, who absconded with the proceeds. Vagliano, who contended that
payment by the Bank of England was a mispayment, sued the Bank
for the amount so paid and charged to his account.
Now, while Vagliano was described as an "acceptor," and was truly
an acceptor as far as the form of the bill was concerned, he was never-
theless the orderer or drawer as to the bank at which the bill was pay-
able. By the arrangement between Vagliano and the bank, the accept-
ance of the bill by Vagliano constituted an authorization or order on
nChalmers, Vagliano's Case (189i) 7 L. Q. Rev. 216.
3OBank of England v. Vagliano, [1891] A. C. 107. Excellent comment on this case
is found in Byles on Bills (19th ed., Wellford, 1931) 82.
-The payee was not fictitious in the sense of its being imaginary but only in the
sense that the bill represented no transaction with Petridi and that C. Petride & Co.
had no rights in it and the fraudulent party Gyka who supplied the name of the
payee did not intend that the payee have any interest in the bill.
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the bank to pay the bill to the holder. The effect of the acceptance, as
between acceptor and the bank at which the bill was payable, was
much the same as if the acceptor, Vagliano, had countersigned or vali-
dated or "okayed" a forged check payable to the order of C. Petridi
& Co. at the request of his fraudulent agent, Gyka.
Once we recognize the fact that the so-called acceptance of Vagliano
was an authorization or order on the bank to pay, we see that Vagliano's
case is typical of most of the American cases involving the fictitious
payee.3
2
In the famous case of Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. W. C. & H. Savings
Bank,33 the executive officer empowered to sign checks for the Piston
Ring Co. instrusted a pretty secretary named Helen Culbert to pre-
pare the bi-weekly payroll checks. Helen got the habit of adding to the
list of checks for bona fide employees checks payable to non-existing
persons, dead people and former employees. The executive officer so
far trusted Helen that he signed these checks without comparing them
with the pay list or time cards or anything else. Helen, of course, made
fictitious indorsements of the fictitious names and the drawee bank
paid these fictitious payee checks to various bona fide purchasers and
charged the account of the Piston Ring Co. In suit testing the right of
the drawee bank to charge the depositor's account, the court held that
the payment of such checks as were drawn to fictitious parties were mis-
payments because the executive officer actually signing the checks did
not know the payees were fictitious and Helen's knowledge was not the
drawer's knowledge, because she was acting adversely to the interest of
her principal. Thus, a loss of $28,ooo was thrown upon the drawee
bank, which, in reality, resulted from the drawer's carelessness.
In a Kentucky case, 31 we get the same result. A fraudulent claim
clerk fabricated many claims against the State of Kentucky and gave a
list of claims to the auditor, including fabricated claims of fictitious
persons. The auditor issued warrants to the State Treasurer authorizing
the Treasurer to issue checks to these fictitious persons. The Treasurer
drew checks on a Frankfort bank, payable to the fictitious parties whose
names were supplied by the auditor, to whom they had been supplied
uCases collected in C. J. S., Bills and Notes, § 129, note 70; Brannan, Negotiable
Instrument Law (6th ed., Beutel, 1938) 2o8-14; 4 Williston on Contracts, (rev. ed.,
Williston and Thompson, 1936) § 1139, p. 3269, note 13. Space does not permit the
inclusion of the names of the large number of cases included in these collections, a
good many of which will be discussed in full.
'3252 Mich. 163, 233 N. W. 185 (5930).
"Commonwealth for use of Coleman v. Farmers Deposit Bank of Frankfort, 264
Ky. 839. 95 S. W. (2d) 793 (1936).
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by the fraudulent claim clerk. The Frankfort bank which paid these
checks bore the loss because the Treasurer who actually drew the checks
did not know the payees were fictitious.
The Piston Ring. Co. case and the Kentucky case represent the over-
whelming weight of authority.3 5 There are a few cases which take the
view that the party who supplies the name is the party whose knowledge
is controlling, where more than one party is involved in drawing the
check. 36 The executive officer who simply moves his fingers in making
the signature is not the "party making the check so payable"; the party
who actually decides who the payee is to be is the party whose knowl-
edge is controlling. That party is the agent or employee intrusted to
supply the name. Where the depositor has not merely intrusted the
agent to supply the name of the payee, but has actually given the agent
power of attorney to draw checks, and the agent pursuant to such au-
thority has knowingly drawn checks payable to the order of "fictitious"
payees, the instruments have been generally held "payable to bearer."
37
In order to protect the banks under such circumstances-and there
seems little doubt, aside from the literal words of the N. I. L. and agency
law, that the banks ought to be protected-the American Bankers Asso-
ciation has proposed that Sub-section 3 of Section 9 of the N. I. L. be
amended to read as follows:
"The instrument is payable to bearer when it is payable to the
order of a fictitious or non-existing or living person not intended
to have any interest in it and such fact was known to the person
making it so payable or known to his employee or other agent
who supplies the name." (The new portion is in italics.)
Some states have already adopted this proposed amendment. If the
Act had been so amended, the result of the Piston Ring Co. case and
the Kentucky case would of course have been changed.
A glance at the portion of the proposed amendment set out in
italics discloses that the amendment goes beyond simply declaring that
the knowledge of the agent supplying the name is the knowledge of the
drawer. It adds a legislative declaration that an instrument is payable
to bearer when it is payable to the order of a real living human being
whenever the drawer or agent or employee supplying the name intends
that the party to whose order the instrument is made or drawn, even
3See note 32, supra.
"See collection of cases in Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed., Beu-
tel, 1938) 221.
nSnyder v. Corn Exchange Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 At. 876 (19o8). Cases collected
in Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed., Beutel, 1938) 556. Problem dis-
cussed by Kulp, The Fictitious Payee (192o) 18 Mich. L. Rev. 296 at 305.
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though a living person, shall not have any interest in the instrument.
The type of case obviously aimed at in this new portion of the
amendment is exemplified by National Fire Insurance Co. v. Mellon
National Bank.38 In this case a fraudulent agent of the Fire Insurance
Company picked out the name of a living human being who was an
actual policy holder in the insurance company, and represented to the
company that this person's house had burned down and requested the
executive officer to draw a check to the order of this policy holder for
the amount of the loss. Upon faith of fabricated proofs of loss, the exe-
cutive officer drew the check, which was cashed by the fraudulent agent
after forging the payee's name, and was paid, upon presentment, by
the drawee bank. At the time the executive officer drew the check, he
did not know that the agent supplying the name intended that the
payee should have no interest in the check, but the agent knew it.
Under the N. I. L., as it now exists, the loss falls upon the bank, ac-
cording to the National Fire Insurance Co. case and according to the
majority rule, but under the proposed amendment, the loss would fall
upon the drawer. As much as the writer approves of the proposed
change which renders the knowledge of the party supplying the name
the knowledge of the drawer, the proposed amendment seems too sweep-
ing in making fictitious parties of real people. The bankers, having ac-
quired the sympathy of most persons familiar with such cases as the
Piston Ring Co. case and the Kentucky case, have consciously or un-
consciously overreached in this second proposal. Under the cloak of a
much needed reform as to one problem, they may be creating another
problem which would do more harm than the reform does good.
The whole problem of the instrument which is payable to a living
person not intended to have any interest therein needs explaining. That
explanation carries us back to our old friend, Vagliano's case,39 which
was discussed above. In that case the court held that a party "not in-
tended by the drawer of a bill to have any interest in it," although a
real living person and client of the acceptor, was a fictitious payee
within the meaning of Section 7-3, as truly as if the drawer had made
up the name out of a more imaginative head.
When it appeared that the payee, C. Petridi &c Co., was an existing
company and that the bill had been drawn by the fraudulent party,
Gyka, to the order of C. Petridi &c Co., for the very reason that Vagliano
was accustomed to accept bills drawn to C. Petridi 2< Co.'s order, and by
'276 Pa. 212, 119 At. 910 (1923).
3'See note 3o , supra.
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so accepting to authorize the Bank of England to pay them, the Lords
began to struggle with their souls over the problem of how a real person
could cease to be a real person and become a fictitious person because of
the drawer's intent that he should have no interest. Lord Herschell said
it was not a question of intention; it was a question of fact. The instru-
ment was not payable to C. Petridi 8: Co. of Constantinople. It repre-
sented no transaction with C. Petridi &c Co. or any other existing person,
and if Petridi 8: Co. came into possession of the bills and indorsed them
away, it would have been a criminal forgery.
And so, in effect, the English law come to this, as far as the cases we
have been considering are concerned: When a drawer voluntarily makes
an instrument payable to the order of either a non-existent person, for
the purpose of creating a false appearance, as in Minet v. Gibson40 or is
tricked by an employee or other third party supplying the name into
making it payable to either a non-existent person or to a real person,
who because he was not a creditor of the drawer would have no right to
indorse it, then the indorsement of the payee is not required in order
for the first true purchaser or his transferee to acquire title.
In other words, whenever the named payee is a person who is not a
creditor or other person entitled to indorse the instrument away, the
necessity of his indorsement is dispensed with as truly as if he were non-
existent.
Most of the cases involving the fictitious payee problem, decided
under the N. I. L., have arisen out of situations in which the drawer or
officer empowered to draw checks or other negotiable paper, has in-
trusted an agent or employee to supply the name of the payee and the
agent or employee has supplied a "fictitious" name. The agent has then
made a fictitious indorsement of the fictitious name, and then after
making his own indorsement has cashed the check at a second bank or
store and absconded with the proceeds. The suits have usually been be-
tween the depositor-drawer and the drawee bank which has paid the
holder, and concern the right of the drawee-payer bank to charge the
drawer's account, the bank introducing the problem of Section 9-3 by
contend-ing that the check was payable to bearer.
In most of the cases the employee who has supplied the names of
the payees has chosen to supply an imaginary name rather than the
name of a "living person not intended to have any interest in the
check." In the Detroit Piston Ring Co. case, Helen Culbert, the em-
ployee, padded the payroll with imaginary names of imaginary em-
103 T. R. 481, 1o Eng. Rep. 689 (1789).
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ployees and dead people, and the check-drawing officer made checks
payable to the order of these imaginary parties. In Commonwealth for
use of Coleman, the fraudulent claim clerk apparently fabricated claims
against the state in favor of imaginary persons and the State Treasurer
drew checks to the order of these imaginary persons. In the Caledonian
Insurance Co. case,41 the employee procured the issuance of a policy of
insurance on an imaginary building in favor of an imaginary person,
and upon faked proofs of an imaginary fire, obtained from the check-
signing officer of the insurance company an instrument payable to an
imaginary policy holder. In the Grand Lodge of Kansas case, 42 the
agent obtained the check-signing officer of the insurance association a
check payable to an imaginary Alice Evans, the imaginary beneficiary
of a policy on the life of her imaginary deceased husband.
In some of the cases the fraudulent employee intrusted by the check-
signing officer to supply the name of the payee has furnished the name
of some regular customer of the drawer or the drawer's company, whom
the drawer knew and reasonably supposed was entitled to such a check,
but who had, in fact, no claim for the amount of the check against the
drawer at the time the instrument was drawn. This type of fraud is, of
course, more likely to deceive the party actually drawing the check than
the type where an imaginary name is used. In the U. S. Cold Storage Co.
case,43 the fraudulent employee, Meister, in furnishing to the check-
drawing officer the names of the parties entitled to checks, carefully se-
lected names of regular customers whom the officer would naturally
suppose were entitled to checks. In the Rancho San Carlos case,44 the
fraudulent employee supplied the name of another employee whom
the officer empowered to draw might reasonably suppose had a claim
for the amount of the instrument. In the Fletcher American National
Bank case,45 the fraudulent agent, Preston, supplied to the check-
drawing officer the name of Lindenmeyer and Sons, from whom the
drawer constantly bought paper. Here it was ordinary routine to sign
checks payable to the order of Lindenmeyer and Sons, but Linden-
"Caledonian Insurance Co. of Edinborough, Scotland v. National City Bank of
New York, 208 App. Div. 83, 2o3 N. Y. Supp. 32 (1924).
"Grand Lodge of Kansas A. 0. U. W. v. Emporia National Bank, ioi Kan. 369,
166 Pac. 490 (1917).
13U. S. Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. District Bank, 343 I11 503, 175 N. E. 825
(1930.
"Rancho San Carlos Inc. v. Bank of Italy National Trust & Savings Ass'n, 123
Cal. App. 29t, 11 P. (2d) 424 (1932).




meyer and Sons had no claim at the time the check was drawn and the
party supplying the name did not intend Lindenmeyer and Sons to
have any interest in the check.
Now, if our legislatures are to be asked to pass the American
Bankers Association's proposed amendment, which makes the knowl-
edge of the agent or employee supplying the name of the payee the
knowledge of the drawer, shall all checks payable to the order of
"parties not intended to have any interest in the instrument" be
treated alike? The cases likely to arise may be divided into five classes:
(1) The agent may supply a fiction-book name or an imaginary
name.
(2) The agent or employee may supply the name of a real living
person who is a total stranger to the drawer and who has therefore
never had any transaction of any sort with the drawer.
(3) The agent or employee may supply the name of some party
who has had an occasional transaction with the drawer and whom the
drawer knows by name and whom the drawer may reasonably think
might have a claim, but who in fact does not.
(4) The agent or employee may supply the name of a regular cus-
tomer or regular client or a party who so habitually sells goods to the
drawer or does services for the drawer that drawing checks in favor of
such person is routine and yet the party whose name is supplied may
have no claim against the drawer for the amount of the check at the
time it is signed by the drawer.
(5) The agent or employee may supply the name of a person who
actually has a claim against the drawer, at the moment the check is
drawn, for the exact amount of the check, and yet the agent or employee
at the time he supplies the name may intend that such payee have no
interest.
It seems that most people's reaction to the cases of the types of 1, 2
and 3 is that it is the drawer rather than the bank which should, in
justice, bear the loss. They approve of the reform sought to be accom-
plished by the proposed American Bankers Association's amendment
so far as these three types of cases are concerned.
They are very likely, however, to view the wording of the amend-
ment with genuine concern when they think of its possible application
to cases of the type of class 5. Suppose the chief executive officer of X
Corporation tells an employee to make a list of persons entitled to
checks on the first of the month and to make out checks payable to the
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order of these persons and prepare them for his signature. The em-
ployee supplies him with sixty-three names and sixty-three checks pay-
able to the order of the sixty-three persons, all of whom have bona fide
claims against the drawer, and the checks are filled out for the correct
amounts; but the employee plans to forge the payee's name to three of
these checks-that is, the agent or employee does not intend that these
three persons have any interest in these three particular checks. If we
read the proposed amendment literally, it is possible to say that these
three checks were "payable to bearer." Such a rule would go far to
wipe out the whole protection afforded the drawer in using face order
paper. While it is perhaps true that no such result is intended, yet it
ought to be clear, from the history of the interpretation of the N. I. L.
that it is dangerous to trust the language of this amendment to the
hands of literalists. Dean Ames was considered a "viewer with alarm"
when he predicted that some literalist would some day render a de-
cision like that of Gulbranson-Dickinson & Co. v. Hopkins,46 but his
gloomy prophecy came true. Men who believe that the right way to
learn the law of the N. I. L. is to "read the Act," regardless of the his-
tory of the problem the section attempts to settle, are likely to read the
amended section and hold that the loss should fall on the drawer as to
the three checks, with relation to which the employee intended the
payee should have no interest.
It is very doubtful whether the American lawyer and business man
would, with his eyes open, pass an amendment to the N. I. L. which
rendered instruments of the class 4 type of case "payable to bearer."
When X Co. constantly purchases paper from Lindenmeyer and Sons
and makes a check payable to the order of Lindenmeyer and Sons as a
matter of routine almost every month, is it not true, from a practical
standpoint, that Lindenmeyer and Sons is factually the payee of a check
drawn to the order of Lindenmeyer and Sons, despite the fact that
Lindenmeyer and Sons happened to have no claim for the exact
amount of the check, or for any amount, at the moment the drawer
signed? Should such a check be held payable to bearer simply because
the employee had a secret intent that Lindenmeyer and Sons was in-
tended by him to have no interest in the check?
Of course this whole matter ought to be determined as a practical
problem of fair distribution of proper risks between the drawer and the
46170 Wis. 326, 175 N. W. 93 (1919). This case has no direct connection with our
immediate problem but is a good example of the bad result of attempting to inter
.pret the Negotiable Instruments Law literally.
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drawee bank, or as between drawer and purchaser. No heaven-niade
solution is found in Section 9-3, which declared the rule of cases that
had nothing to do with the specific problem. It must be admitted that
Vagliano's case was a typical case of the type described as class 4, and
that the English court protected the bank at the expense of the orderer.
While American courts have paid lip service to Vagliano's case, there
is no established body of American authority committing us to the
view that a check is payable to bearer when the drawer has made it pay-
able to the order of a regular customer, simply because the fraudulent
employeee planned to forge the check.
It will be noted that the proposed amendment, in declaring the rule
that the knowledge of the agent or employee supplying the name is the
knowledge of the drawer himself, confines the rule to agents and em-
ployees. There seems to be no good reason why this rule should not be
appiled whenever any person, whether an agent or not, is intrusted to
supply the name, even though the party intrusted be a stranger. For
example, in United Cigar Stores Co. v. American Raw Silk Mill Co.,
47
a total stranger came to the drawer and solicited a donation to a non-
existent cause. The stranger introduced himself as Lieutenant Peterson,
and represented himself as a solicitor for the cause of the Navy Tuber-
culosis Camp. The drawer, moved by emotions of patriotism and pity
for the poor tubercular sailors, decided to make a donation. He asked
Lieutenant Peterson to whom the check should be made payable. The
stranger, Peterson, told the drawer to make it payable to Lieutenant
R. G. Parks, whom he said was treasurer of the fund. The drawer com-
plied with the stranger's request. There was no such person as Parks
and there was no Navy Tuberculosis Camp. Peterson, of course, wrote
Parks' name on the back of the check and cashed it. Now, in such
case, why should the drawee bank lose rather than the drawer? It was
more unbusinesslike to trust the stranger than to trust an agent or
employee.
There is another type of case in which the problem of the fictitious
payee is sometimes discussed by the court and in which the court
sometimes says that the instrument is payable to bearer because the
payee is fictitious. Little attention has been given to these cases because
a discussion of the problem is not really necessary to the decisions. First
National Bank of Portland v. U. S. National Bank48 is an example. A
47184 App. Div. 217, 171 N. Y. Supp. 480 (1918).
sioo Ore. 264, 197 Pac. 547, 14 A. L. R. 479 (1921). Other cases of this type shown
in Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed., Beutel, 1938) 220.
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fraudulent party who may have been named Smith or Wilson or John-
son, but who passed in the community by the name of Shea, forged a
corporation's name as drawer of a check on First Bank, payable to the
order of Shea wrote the name "Shea" on the back of the instrument and
cashed it at a store. The store cashed it at the U. S. National Bank, to
whom it was paid by First Bank. The drawee First Bank having re-
credited the account of the drawer, sued the recipient of payment,
U. S. National Bank for money had and received under mistake. The
defendant, of course, pleaded the Price v. Neal defense. The plaintiff
denied that the defendant had acquired title to the instrument under
the indorsement of Shea, upon the theory that this indorsement was a
forgery. The court held that the defendant had acquired title to the
instrument, invoked the usual Price v. Neal doctrine and therefore held
for the defendant. While the court said that the instrument was pay-
able to bearer because the payee was fictitious and the forging drawer
knew it, it was not necessary to say this. The same result could have
been achieved by saying that the forger had adopted the name Shea for
the purpose of this transaction and that the true payee of the forged
check had indorsed it. It would seem better to avoid the vague doctrine
of the fictitious payee in this type of case.
Still another type of case is that of the remitter purchasing a draft,
and the drawer drawing it payable to the order of the name supplied by
the remitter, the remitter furnishing a fictitious name or the name of a
party intended by the remitter to have no interest therein, and the ac-
tual drawer having no knowledge that the payee is "fictitious."
In a recent California case,49 the court held that such an instru-
ment was payable to bearer. This case, of course, represents the minority
rule of cases decided under the N. I. L. as unamended in that the actual
drawer had no knowledge that the payee was fictitious. In jurisdictions
adopting the American Bankers Association's proposed amendment,
however, the draft would be clearly payable to bearer.
The problem of the fictitious payee is sometimes improperly raised
in cases of instruments payable to estates. An instrument payable to the
order of Christian Hansen (sic) Estate50 was held payable to bearer by
the Minnesota Court as late as 1928, but both Mr. Kulp 5l and Mr.
"Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Security First National Bank, 8 Cal. (2d) 303, 65 P.
(2d) 355 (937), 25 Calif. L. Rev. 66.
10Hansen v. North Western Nat. Bank of Minn., 173 Minn. 453, 221 N. W. 873
(1928).
"Kulp, The Fictitious Payee (192o) 18 Mich. L. Rev. 296 at 298.
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Beute 52 agree that such instruments should be held payable to the
order of the personal representative. Although the case is approved in
an A. L. R. note,53 Mr. Beutel suggests that the writer of the note over-
looked section 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Mr. Kulp fur-
ther states that an instrument drawn to the order of a deceased person
in ignorance of his death should be treated as payable to order of the
personal representative. Mr. Kulp gives Lord Chalmers, author of the
B. E. A., as authority for this statement 5 4 We may assume that Mr.
Beutel and Mr. Kulp would agree that an instrument payable to the
order of an estate could be held payable to bearer if there was no such
estate or the estate was not intended by the drawer to have any interest
in the instrument or the estate was legally fictitious.
The problem of the fictitious payee is again improperly raised in
connection with instruments payable to the order of a business name
or a company name where there is, in one sense, no such company in-
corporated or unincorporated. For example: John Jones is the owner
of a business conducted in the name of Jones Sales Co. Having sold
goods to Smith, Jones requests that the check for the price be made
payable to the order of Jones Sales Co. Such a check should be treated
as order paper indorseable by Jones55 Of course a company name or a
business name might be legally fictitious, if imaginary, or because the
drawer intended the company to have no interest.
In seeking a solution of the problems which actually have arisen in
the cases, the writer would prefer the following rules to the "new wine
in old bottles" form of expression in the American Bankers Associa-
tion's proposed amendent:
I. When the maker of a negotiable note or the drawer of a nego-
tiable bill of exchange or check, in order to create the false appearance
of a previous indorsement or negotiation, issues the instrument to his
immediate creditor or to an accomplice, in such form that it appears to
be payable on its face to the order of a named person, who is in fact
fictitious or imaginary, or who although a real person has no right to
the instrument, such maker or drawer may be estopped to require the
indorsement of the named payee as against the drawee or bona fide pur-
chaser who has no knowledge that the payee is fictitious or imaginary
or non-existent or that the payee is a real person having no rights in
the instrument.
-Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed., Beutel, 1938) 226.
5'Note (1929) 6o A. L. R. 6o5.
5 Chalmers, Bills of Exchange (6th ed.) 24.
5Bryant v. Castman, 7 Cush. iii (Mass. 1851).
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II. When the maker of a negotiable note or the drawer of a nego-
tiable bill or check, in issuing the instrument, intrusts an agent or em-
ployee or any other person to supply the name of the payee to whose
order the instrument is drawn, and such agent or employee or other
person so intrusted supplies the name of a non-existent or imaginary or
fictitious person or the name of a real person having no right to the
instrument, the maker or drawer may be estopped to require the payee's
indorsement as against a drawee who has no knowledge that the payee is
imaginary or fictitious or who has no knowledge that the named
payee had no rights in the instrument, or may be so estopped as against
an innocent purchaser of the instrument.
But this rule shall not apply when the payee is a creditor of the
maker or the drawer for the amount of the instrument, nor in case the
payee is a regular customer of the maker or drawer whom the maker
or drawer might,, under standards of ordinary business prudence, rea-
sonably suppose was entitled to the instrument.
III. When an agent of a maker of a negotiable note or the agent of
the drawer of a negotiable check or bill of exchange is given actual
power to make or draw the instrument 56 rather than being merely in-
trusted by the drawer to supply the name of the payee to whose order
the instrument is made or drawn, and such agent makes or draws the
instrument to the order of an imaginary or fictitious or non-existent
person or to the order of a real person having no rights in the instru-
ment, whether a regular customer of the maker or drawer or not, the
maker or drawer may be estopped to require the indorsement of the
payee as against a bona fide purchaser or drawee having no knowledge
of the fact that such named payee was fictitious or imaginary or non-
existent or having no knowledge that the real person had no rights in
the instrument.
IV. The payees of instruments payable to the order of estates or
business names shall not be deemed fictitious so long as the personal
representatives of such estates or the owners of such businesses are
creditors for the amounts of the instruments or are regular customers
of the drawer or are parties having a right to the instruments, and such
paper is to be controlled by Section 8 of the N. I. L.; but instruments
payable to the order of an estate may be deemed fictitious within the
meaning of rules 1, 2 and 3, if there is no such estate having a claim
against the drawer and an instrument payable to the order of a busi-
-Snyder v. Corn Exchange Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 Ad. 453 (1908) -
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ness name may be deemed fictitious if there is no person doing business
in that name who has any claim against the drawer for the amount of
the check unless he is a regular customer of the drawer.
V. Instruments payable to "cash" or to "bills payable" or to des-
ignations not purporting to be the name of any person or corporation
or partnership or other business shall not be deemed fictitious but
shall be deemed face bearer paper within the rule of Section 9-4.
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